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In this paper we present a social network and forensic analysis of the vote counts of Spanish
national elections that took place in December 2015 and their sequel in June 2016. Vote counts are
extracted at the level of municipalities, yielding an unusually high resolution dataset with over 8000
samples. We initially consider the phenomenon of Bipartisanship breakdown by analysing spatial
distributions of several Bipartisanship indices. We find that such breakdown is more prominent
close to cosmopolite and largely populated areas and less important in rural areas where Biparti-
sanship still prevails, and its evolution mildly consolidates in the 2016 round, with some evidence of
Bipartisanship reinforcement which we hypothesize to be due to psychological mechanisms of risk
aversion. We subsequently consider a functional network analysis by which we are able to cluster
together municipalities with similar voting statistics, finding an effective partition of municipalities
which remarkably coincides with the first-level political and administrative division of autonomous
communities. On a third step we explore to which extent vote data are faithful by applying forensic
techniques to vote statistics. To tackle this question we first address the frequencies of the first
and second significant digits in vote counts and explore the conformance of these distributions at
three different levels of aggregation to Benford’s law for each of the main political parties. The re-
sults and interpretations are mixed and vary across different levels of aggregation, finding a general
good quantitative agreement at the national scale for both municipalities and precincts but finding
systematic nonconformance at the level of individual precincts. As a complementary metric, we
further explore the co-occurring statistics of voteshare and turnout, finding a mild tendency in the
clusters of the conservative party to smear out towards the area of high turnout and voteshare, what
has been previously interpreted as a possible sign of incremental fraud. In every case results are
qualitatively similar between 2015 and 2016 elections.
Keywords: social network analysis, forensic analysis; electoral data; Benford’s law; Spanish elections
I. INTRODUCTION AND DATASETS
In the last decade and in parallel with the improvement of computational resources and the possibility of accessing,
storing and manipulating massive digital records easily, the political science community has engaged with the task of
producing quantitative and systematic methods to detect irregularities in electoral results [1]. In this work we analyze
the vote count statistics obtained in the Spanish national elections that took place in December 2015 as well as in their
sequel of June 2016. Since the end of 2014, the emergence of new parties such as the anti-austerity Podemos and the
rise of other ones such as Ciudadanos (C’s) challenged an already decadent bipartisanship system, as was evidenced
by the highly fragmented total voteshare in 2015. These results further defined a new type of political equilibrium
in Spain, where the quest for alliances across parties was required to form a workable majority. Unfortunately this
situation was not achieved and the parliament was unable to build the necessary coalitions to make such a workable
majority, what triggered the onset of new elections only six months after the previous ones, in June 2016. These
special and unique conditions, together with the fact that the polls and electoral surveys preceding and on the day of
the elections showed an unusually high discrepancy with the actual results motivates the use of some of the recently
developed techniques for elections forensic analysis to scrutinize any source of irregularity in these elections.
High resolution vote count data (at several levels of aggregation down to the level of municipalities) have been
extracted from the official webpage of the Ministerio Del Interior [2] (Spanish ministry of home affairs) for both 2015
and 2016 elections. For concreteness we have focused on vote counts on congress and discarded senate (see Fig. 1 for
a guide of the type of data available from the ministry of home affairs website).
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2FIG. 1: Sample municipality (Arteixo) along with vote count statistics, as reported in the Ministerio del Interior official webpage
[2].
The high quality of the dataset under study allows us to address important social and political questions in a scientific
way. In this work we have considered three specific questions, namely (i) can we confirm that the bipartisanship
system is challenged? (ii) Can a social network analysis reveal quantitative information on the voting profiles and
similarities across municipalities and regions? And (iii) can we scrutinize these data against forensic techniques?
And if so, is there any evidence of fraud?
To address the first question we will define a set of Bipartisanship indices and will explore the spatial distribution of
these over the Iberian peninsula of Spain (at the fine-grained level of municipalities), while for the second question
we will build on state of the art community detection methods (Infomap) applied on a functional-like network of
municipalities extracted via cosine similarity.
The third question will be addressed via two different studies. The first one addresses the deviation or conformance
of vote counts statistics to the so-called Benford’s law [9, 12] that predicts that the first significant digits in some
datasets (including vote counts) should follow an inverse-logarithmic distribution. The rationale for this analysis is
that statistically significant deviations between the empirical distribution and the theoretical one point us toward
electoral irregularities. These irregularities might in turn be due either to unintentional mismanagement of the voting
process and/or to fraud. This type of analysis only flags the existence of such irregularities and gives no judgment
on what was the cause for such irregularity. To complement this study, we then explore the presence and detection
of sources of incremental and extreme fraud from the co-occurring statistics of vote and turnout numbers, following
a recent study [15].
The rest of the paper goes as follows: in section II we introduce similarity indices and explore the spatial distribution
of these. Having access to the 2015 and 2016 election statistics, we will be able to explore the social effect of distrust
and the possible longitudinal progression of Bipartisanship breakdown. In section III we perform the social network
analysis of the data, creating functional networks via cosine similarity computed on the vote profile at the level of
municipalities. Then, in section IV we focus on forensic methods. We introduce Benford’s law along with the precise
types of statistical tests that have been proposed in the realm of election forensics, and we present the results obtained
from these tests for both the December 2015 and June 2016 elections at three different levels of aggregation. The
main results and interpretations on this first study are reported in this section and additional material and analysis
are shown in an appendix. In this section we also present the second forensic analysis that addresses the co-occurring
statistics of vote and turnout numbers. Finally, in section V we provide some discussion and conclude.
3II. BIPARTISANSHIP INDICES
Votecounts can be aggregated at several spatial levels (municipalities, precincts, etc). In general, for a specific
region (e.g. a given municipality) vote data consist of a vector of vote percentage v = (v1, v2, . . . ) where vi is
the percentage of votes to party i, and
∑N
i=1 vi = 1, N being the total number of parties with representation in
that region. Whereas in a majority of municipalities the main national-wide parties PP, PSOE, Cs and PODE-
MOS have representation, other smaller, regional (or otherwise) parties also appear with different frequency in the
different municipalities. In other words, N (total number of parties) might fluctuate from municipality to municipality.
Bipartisanship index (BI). As a crude metric, we initially define a Bipartisanship Index (BIi) of a given
municipality (respectively precinct, etc) i as the sum of the vote percentage ratio (between 0 and 1) of the two
most-voted parties in i. For a purely bipartisanship region i (N = 2), BIi approaches 1, whereas in the ideal case of
a multipartidist region, BI would approach its minimum value 2/N . This metric allows us to compare the relative
level of Bipartisanship across regions.
In Fig.2 we provide a spatial heat map of Spain where we plot BIi for each municipality i = 1, 2, . . . , 8215, for the
2015 and 2016 elections data respectively (note that for illustration constraints Canary Islands are not represented
here, but we shall emphasize that data and results there are qualitatively equivalent to those obtained for the
Iberian peninsula and Balearic Islands). First, we can observe that there is a clear tendency towards relatively lower
Bipartisanship in areas that correspond to highly-populated regions, e.g. Madrid, Catalonia. This finding is well
aligned with the social observation that the process of Bipartisanship breakdown, as other social changes, initially
develops close to important cosmopolite cities and then percolate to more rural areas. A second interesting finding
is that from 2015 to 2016 there is a stalling in the Bipartisanship breakdown, and its average index over all spanish
municipalities even slightly increases from 〈BI〉 = 0.70 ± 0.12 in 2015 to 〈BI〉 = 0.73 ± 0.11 in 2016 (this small
increase is however within error bars so one cannot rule out this being a statistical artifact). A possible sociological
interpretation is the following: after the 2015 elections parliament was unable to build the necessary coalitions to
make a workable majority, and this was the trigger to the new elections only six months after the previous ones, in
June 2016. As society is averse to the uncertainty generated by frustrated elections, risk aversion might have stalled
the overall inertia that a priori was driving the Bipartisanship breakdown, and the fear of not being able to find
workable majorities might have forced some voters in the most conservative regions to turn back to a bipartisanship
strategy that indeed guarantees those much-needed majorities.
At a regional level we can observe that this phenomenon is highly heterogeneous: whereas there is a very acute trend
towards Bipartisanship breakdown consolidation in specific regions such as the autonomous community of Valencia,
in other regions such as the autonomous community of Galicia the trend is pretty much the opposite.
In the right panel of Fig.2 we plot the frequency histogram of Bipartisanship indices, for both 2015 and 2016. For
2015 a clear Gaussian-like shape emerges, and such shape is slightly perturbed for the 2016 case. In the latter case we
observe weird peaks and pits emerging in the distribution leaving a trace of wild fluctuations which are not present
in the 2015 statistics. Comparing both histograms we can perceive a subtle shift towards higher values of BI.
Entropy index (E). Intuitively, Bipartisanship tends to accumulate vote percentage in a few parties, whereas
multipartidism tends to spread out votes across parties. Following this argument, in order to quantify more precisely
the concentration of vote percentages over the whole set of parties one can define an entropy index for region i as
Ei = −
∑N
j=1 vj log vj
logN
This quantity is bounded in 0 ≤ Ei ≤ 1, reaching the minimum for unipartidism (a single party gets 100% of the
votes in the region) and reaching its maximum for multipartidism (all N parties get the same percentage of votes).
Qualitatively we have found similar results when exploring spatial distributions of the entropy index Ei to those
obtained with the more crude quantifier BI (see Fig. 12 in the appendix).
Diversity index. Inspired by ecological metrics [20], here we further define the diversity index Neff of a given region
as the effective number of political parties. This refers to the number of ‘equally voted parties’ needed to obtain the
same mean proportional parties vote percentage as that observed in the dataset (where all parties may not be equally
abundant):
Neff = exp(E logN),
where E is the entropy index as defined above. In other words, Neff counts, assuming that effective parties all get the
same number of votes, the number of such effective parties one would need to find the same entropy index as found
4FIG. 2: (Left and middle panels) Heat map of the Bipartisanship index (BI, see the text) at the municipality level (the darker,
the larger BI, and the more bipartisanship the system is) for 2015 elections (left panel) and 2016 elections (right panel). One
can see that overall Bipartisanship decreases from 2015 to 2016, and that Bipartisanship breakdown is more acute closer to
important, cosmopolite cities (e.g. Madrid, Barcelona, etc). (Right panel) Frequency histogram of BI for 2015 and 2016. In
2015 the distribution has a clear Gaussian shape and such shape is slightly perturbed in 2016.
FIG. 3: (Left and middle panels) Heat map of the diversity index (Neff, see the text) at the municipality level (the darker,
the larger Neff, and the less bipartisanship the system is) for 2015 elections (left panel) and 2016 elections (right panel). One
can see that overall the system is more diverse in 2015 and its diversity decreases in 2016. This result is in consonance with
Bipartisanship breakdown stalling, probably due to risk aversion that generates the undertainty associated to not obtaining
workable majorities in parliament. (Right panel) Frequency histogram of Neff for 2015 and 2016, highlighting an initially diverse
voting ecosystem with 〈Neff〉 = 4.1 (over four relevant parties on average) in 2015, and a clear shift towards a smaller diversity
in 2016.
by computing E to the vote statistics. In the left and middle panels of figure 3 we plot such index for 2015 (left) and
2016 (middle) elections. We clearly observe two important stylized facts, namely (i) as already found in BI and E,
there is a clear separation between regions close to cosmopolite and largely populated cities, whose diversity index
tends to be large, entailing a high number of effective parties at play, and regions which are typically less populated
(rural areas) with lower diversity index. (ii) At odds with BI, the overall index evidences a marked decrease between
2015 and 2016, visually observed by a drift in heat map towards lighter color (i.e. lower values of diversity) and a
change in the diversity distribution (right panel of figure 3).
III. FUNCTIONAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
In this section we make use of tools from Network Theory [3] to explore the vote similarity across regions. Attached
to each municipality we consider the vote percentage vector v defined above. We measure the similarity between the
voting statistics of two municipalities i and j via the so-called cosine similarity
Sij =
〈v(i),v(j)〉
||v(i)|| · ||v(i)|| ,
where 〈·, ·〉 is the standard scalar product and || · || is the `2 norm. By construction, 0 ≤ Sij ≤ 1, where complete
similarity (Sij = 1) is reached when the vote statistics are identical and null similarity is reached when v
(i) ⊥ v(j),
5FIG. 4: Estimated probability density of similarity values P (S) for the fully connected, weighted similarity matrix S.
i.e. when a non-null percentage to a given party in one municipality is always matched to a null percentage in the
other municipality.
The matrix S = {Sij} naturally defines a fully-connected weighted network where nodes are municipalities, and
every pair of nodes i and j are linked with an edge with weight Sij . In our database we have a total number of about
8 · 103 municipalities, hence a fully connected network of about 8 · 103 nodes and 64 · 106 edges. In fig 4 we plot
the edge’s weight probability density P (S). As expected, weights are concentrated in a region relatively close to the
maximum value, something that can be justified already by noting that, in most of the municipalities, all four parties
PP, PSOE, Cs and PODEMOS have a non-null vote percentage. To get some insight beyond this simple statistc,
we now run an algorithm to detect communities –i.e. large groups of nodes which are similar to each other and less
similar to the nodes in the other groups–. To do this we run Infomap [4, 5] on the undirected and weighted network
after a simple thresholding is performed on S: for a given node i, we only conserve the largest similarity weights Sij
such that all nodes at least have degree k = 10. In other words, we perform a parallel pruning on the edges, starting
from those with smaller weights, and we prune the network up to the point where we cannot prune anymore if we
want to make sure every node has a degree k ≥ 10. The first level of Infomap reveals a total of 14 communities in 2015
and 16 communities in 2016. In fig. 5 we plot a spatial projection of the network, where nodes are municipalities.
For exposition reasons, edges are not plotted in the figure as otherwise the image wouldn’t carry much information.
Nodes belonging to the same network community are colored equally. Resemblance between network communities
obtained via Infomap in our functional network and actual Spanish autonomous communities is remarkable, and
such similitude is more acute in 2015 –where Bipartisanship breakdown is slightly more pronounced– than in 2016,
where Bipartisanship slightly reduced –as reported by the diversity index– and this has the effect of fuzzing up the
relation between network communities and autonomous community divisions. Interestingly, one finds what we could
call stable and compact autonomous communities (those which have a well-defined, stable over time and cohesive
functional community counterpart): Catalonia, Madrid, Basque Country, Navarra, whereas other set of communities
have a clear counterpart in 2015 but a fuzzier one in 2016 (e.g. Comunitat Valenciana, Andalucia, Murcia, etc).
Another set of autonomous communities present a highly heterogeneous voting profiles and don’t present any clear
functional community counterpart. Theoretical digressions and insights that could give a socio-political justification
for this classification are left as an open question for future work.
IV. FORENSIC ANALYSIS
A. Benford’s law
The first significant digit (or leading digit) of a number is defined as its non-zero leftmost digit (for instance the
leading digit of 123 is 1 whereas the leading digit of 0.025 is 2). The so-called Benford’s law is an empirical statistical
law stating that in particular types of numeric datasets the probality of finding an entry whose first significant digit
is d decays logarithmically as
P (d) = log10(1 + 1/d), (1)
6FIG. 5: First level communities obtained via community detection algorithm Infomap, performed on the thresholded, undirected
and weighted network based on the similarity matrix S (see the text). Here we color nodes belonging to the same community
in the same colour. There is an appreciable matching between functional network communities in the network of municipalities
and actual Spanish autonomous communities, although this correspondence is much more evident for the 2015 round, where
Bipartisanship breakdown was at its zenith.
where log10 stands here for the decimal logarithm (note that trivially
∑9
d=1 P (d) = 1). Perhaps counterintuitively,
this law is quite different from the expected distribution arising from an uncorrelated random process (e.g. coin
tossing or extracting numbers at random from an urn) which would yield a uniform distribution where every leading
digit would be equally likely to appear. The logarithmically decaying shape given in eq.1 was empirically found
first in 1881 by astronomer Simon Newcomb and later popularized and exhaustively studied by Frank Benford
[6]. Empirical datasets that comply to Benford’s law emerge in as disparate places as for stock prizes or physical
constants, and some mathematical sequences such as binomial arrays or some geometric sequences have been
shown to conform to Benford. A possible origin of this law has been rigorously explained by Hill [7], who proved
a central limit-type theorem by which random entries picked from random distributions form a sequence whose
leading digit distribution converges to Benford’s law. Another explanation comes from the theory of multiplicative
processes, as it is well known that power-law distributed stochastic processes follow Benford’s law for the specific
case of a density 1/x (see [8] and references therein for details). In practice, this law is expected to emerge
in a range of empirical datasets where part or all of the following criteria hold: (i) the data ranges a broad
interval encompassing several orders of magnitude rather uniformly, (ii) the data are the outcome of different ran-
dom processes with different probability densities, (iii) the data are the result of one or several multiplicative processes.
Mainly advocated by Nigrini [9], the application of Benford’s law to detect fraud and irregularities -by observing
anomalous and statistically significant deviations from eq.1 for datasets which otherwise should conform to that
distribution- has become popular in recent years, and from now on we quote this a 1BL test. Mansilla [10] and
Roukema [11] applied this methodology to assess Mexican and Iranian vote count results respectively. On the other
hand, Mebane [12] advocates instead to look at the second significant digit (which follows an extended version of
Benford’s law [13]) and argues that the frequencies of election vote counts at precinct level approximate a Benford
distribution for the second digit, and accordingly mismanaged or fraudulent manipulation of vote counts would induce
a statistically significant deviation in the distribution of the second leading digit, detected by a simple Pearson χ2
goodness of fit test. Mebane applied this so-called 2BL test to assess the cases of Florida 2004 and Mexico 2006, and
other authors have subsequently applied this in many other occasions (see [14] and references therein). In this case
the theoretical distribution takes a more convoluted shape than eq.1, namely
P2(d) =
9∑
k=1
log10
(
1 +
1
10k + d
)
, (2)
and a good numerical approximation [13, 14] is given by
P2(d) ' (0.11968, 0.11389, 0.10882, 0.10433, 0.10031, 0.09668, 0.09337, 0.09035, 0.08757, 0.08500).
We start by exploring 1BL and 2BL tests applied to vote count statistics nationally using the fine-grained data given
by splitting vote counts at the level of municipalities (with over 8000 samples, vote counts ranging in about five
7Year Political party # observations χ2 1BL MAD 1BL χ2 2BL MAD 2BL
2015 PP 8182 23.079 0.0052 8.737 0.0027
2016 PP 8186 21.408 0.0046 4.142 0.0021
2015 PSOE 8135 13.486 0.0030 17.648 0.0038
2016 PSOE 8121 15.040 0.0033 13.065 0.0038
2015 Podemos & Co. 7927 4.845 0.0020 21.329 0.0050
2016 Unidos Podemos 8056 3.537 0.0019 18.314 0.0048
2015 C’s 8037 11.933 0.0036 10.934 0.0034
2016 C’s 8001 9.671 0.0033 10.951 0.0039
TABLE I: Statistical tests of conformance to Benford’s law for the first (1BL) and second (2BL) significant digit distribution for
the vote counts of each political party (at the level of municipalities), along with χ2 and MAD statistics. In blue we highlight
the datasets where the null hypothesis can be rejected with 95% confidence but not with 99% and in red cases for which where
the null hypothesis can be rejected with more than 99% confidence according to χ2. On the basis of MAD statistic the null
hypothesis of conformance to Benford’s laws cannot be rejected for any case.
orders of magnitude). With socio-political impact in mind, from now on we focus on the vote statistics to the main,
national-wide parties PP, PSOE, Cs and PODEMOS.
Results for the 1BL are shown in the left panels of Fig. 6 (left panel depicts results for the 2015 elections while
the right panel does the same for the 2016 case). As expected the distributions seem to be close to Benford’s law
for all political parties, at least visually, and there are no obvious differences between 2015 and 2016. To have a
better quantitative understanding, we have made use of two statistics: (i) the classical Pearson’s χ2 and (ii) the mean
absolute deviation (MAD) test as proposed by Nigrini [9]. In both cases the null hypothesis H0 is that data conform
to Benford’s law. The former statistic reads
χ2 = N
9∑
d=m
[Pobs(d)− Pth(d)]2
Pth(d)
,
where Pth(d) and Pobs(d) are the theoretical and observed relative frequencies of each digit and m = 1 for 1BL and
m = 0 for 2BL. This statistic has 8 degrees of freedom for 1BL and 9 for 2BL (as in this latter case the digit zero has
to be incorporated as a candidate) and is to be compared to certain critical values, such that if χ2 > χ2n,a then H0 is
rejected with the selected level of confidence level a. For n = 8 degrees of freedom, the critical values at the 95% and
99% are 15.507 and 20.090 respectively, whereas for n = 9 degrees of freedom the critical values at the 95% and 99%
are 16.919 and 21.666 respectively.
The mean absolute deviation is defined as
MAD =
1
10−m
9∑
d=m
|Pobs(d)− Pth(d)|,
where m is the initial digit (1 for 1BL, 0 for 2BL). Whereas this statistic lacks clear cut-off values, Nigrini provides the
following rule of thumb for 1BL: MAD between 0 and 0.004 implies close conformity; from 0.004 to 0.008 acceptable
conformity; from 0.008 to 0.012 marginally acceptable conformity; and, finally, greater than 0.012, nonconformity. To
the best of our knowledge, the critical values for MAD have not yet been established for 2BL so all over this work we
will assume the same ones as for 1BL.
Results for 1BL can be found in table I. We conclude that for the Pearson χ2 test, H0 cannot be rejected with
sufficiently high confidence in three out of the four main political parties but the χ2 result for PP is consistently large
and suggests rejection of the null hypothesis with a confidence of 99%. These results are in contrast with those found
using the MAD statistic, where according to Nigrini all political parties conform to Benford’s law (PP only showing
acceptable conformity and the rest showing close conformity).
The results on 2BL are shown in the right panels of Fig. 6 and test statistics are summarized again in table I. These
suggest an overall conformance to the second digit law, with exception flagging nonconformace raised by χ2 that
rejects H0 at 95% for Podemos (2015), Unidos-Podemos (2016) and PSOE (2015).
1. Individual analysis at the precincts level
In order to give a closer look to the vote count distributions we now explore the statistics taking place at each
separate precinct. At this point we need to recall that among other criteria Benford’s law is expected to emerge
8FIG. 6: Histograms of relative frequencies for the first (left panels) and second (right panels) significant digits of the four most
important political parties vote counts over municipalities (more than 8000 in each case) for the 2015 (upper panels) and 2016
(bottom panels) elections
in datasets where data range several orders of magnitude. This hypothesis was fulfilled at the national scale as
the population of municipalities ranges several orders of magnitude (O(1) – O(105), see Table IV) if we consider
all of them. However this is not straightforward at the precinct level, where the number of municipalities is highly
heterogeneous from precinct to precinct. In Fig. 19 (appendix) we have checked that the number of orders of
magnitude that vote counts span at the precinct level is indeed linearly correlated with the number of municipalities
the precinct contains (R2 = 0.47). This means that the larger the number of municipalities considered in a single
analysis, the more we should expect data to conform to Benford’s law.
That being said, for each and every precinct in Spain we proceed to extract the frequencies of the first and second
significant digits found for all the municipalities inside that precinct, and make a goodness of fit test between these
empirical distributions and 1BL and 2BL using both χ2 and MAD statistics. Results on 1BL are summarized for
the case of χ2 in the left panels of 7 and in the appendix Fig. 14, finding an overall good conformance to 1BL at
the precinct level. Conversely, MAD statistics (Fig. 13 in the appendix) say just the opposite, suggesting systematic
non-conformance. As for the 2BL test, there exists a strong deviation from the expected distribution (right panels of
Fig. 7 for χ2 and appendix Fig.13 for MAD), and both statistics consistently reject the null hypothesis of conformance
to Benford’s law for all political parties.
Now, note that at each individual precinct we expect statistics to be a priori poorer than at the national scale, as the
average number of municipalities per precinct is of the order of O(102) (see table IV for details), that is, one order
of magnitude smaller. As MAD does not include any correction term that depends on the sample set, one should
therefore take the results associated to MAD with a pinch of salt. This is not necessarily the case for the χ2 as this
latter statistic takes into account in its definition the number of samples. In any case, in order to assess whether the
strong nonconformance to 2BL at this level of aggregation is just due to finite size effects we explore the dependence
of both the χ2 and MAD results on the precinct’s size. Accordingly, in Fig. 8 we plot for each precinct its χ2 and
MAD result as a function of the number of municipalities present in that precinct. As expected, we find that MAD
suffers from finite size effects and is over conservative for small sample sizes, however this effect is rather weak and
9FIG. 7: Summary of Pearson χ2 goodness of fit to 1BL (left panels) and 2BL (right panels) for 2015 (upper panels) and 2016
(bottom panels) extracted from analysis of each individual precinct (each precinct contains a different number of municipalities
and shows a precise distribution and an associated χ2, so here we plot the mean ± standard deviation over all Spanish precincts
(excluding Ceuta and Melilla, precincts with a single municipality) for the main parties. In every case the critical values
for rejection at the 95 and 99% confidence level are shown. Interestingly, in the case of 1BL for a large majority we accept
conformance to Benford’s law, whereas in the case of 2BL for a large majority the null hypothesis is rejected. Results based
on MAD suggest that neither 1BL nor 2BL is accepted (Fig. 13 in the appendix).
not enough to explain the systematic nonconformance to 2BL. In the case of the χ2 statistic we observe quite the
opposite effect: the larger the number of municipalities in a given precinct, the more likely the null hypothesis to be
rejected. An equivalent size dependence analysis for the 1BL test is reported in the appendix Fig. 18.
2. Aggregate analysis at the precincts level
To round off our analysis with a third level of aggregation, we explore conformance to 1BL and 2BL when vote
counts are aggregated per precinct. In this case we only have 52 samples (52 precincts) so we expect the distributions
to be more noisy. From the previous analysis, we learned that MAD suffers from finite size effects so we expect MAD
to be more conservative than χ2 at this level of aggregation. In Fig. 9 we show the results for 2016 and we refer the
readers to the appendix Fig. 20 to find analogous results for 2015, which don’t show substantial differences at the
qualitative level. As expected the distributions show larger fluctuations and, in absolute terms, deviate more from the
theoretical laws (depicted in dashed lines). In table II we depict the χ2 and MAD statistics, which, again as expected,
show inconsistent results: while χ2 systematically cannot be rejected with above 95% confidence level, in turn MAD
10
FIG. 8: Scatter plot of the MAD (left panels) and χ2 (right panels) statistics extracted from the 2BL test of each precinct as a
function of the number of municipalities in each precinct (2015 results are shown in the top panels and 2016 ones are shown in
the bottom panels, with no obvious differences). In the case of MAD, we find a weak negative correlation as expected, but this
correlation is not enough to explain the systematic nonconformance to 2BL. In the case of χ2, the effect is quite the opposite,
and nonconformance is stronger as the size of the precinct increases, thereby suggesting that nonconformance to 2BL at this
level of aggregation is a genuine result and not a spurious effect of finite size statistics.
systematically suggests nonconformity. We conclude that this level of aggregation is less informative than previous
ones.
B. Co-occurence heat maps
Our second analysis is inspired by a recent study [15] that explore the co-occurring statistics of vote and turnout
numbers and the associated double mechanism of incremental and extreme fraud by plotting two dimensional his-
tograms (heat maps) reporting, for a given political party, the percentage of vote (voteshare) it got as compared to
the percentage of participation. According to Klimek and co-authors, incremental fraud occurs when with a given
rate, ballots for one party are added to the urn and/or votes for other parties are taken away, and this mechanism is
revealed when the histograms smear out towards the top right corner of the histograms. On the other hand, extreme
fraud (which corresponds to reporting close to complete turnout and almost all votes for a single party) emerges when
the distribution transitions from unimodal to bimodal and one of the modes corresponding to a cluster that concen-
trates close to that corner of 100% participation (complete turnout) and very large vote percentage. They applied
these statistical principles to several national elections, concluding that in the cases of Russia and Uganda fraudulent
manipulation was the most likely underlying mechanism. In Fig. 10 we plot such heat maps for the 2016 case for all
four political parties. Data for PSOE, Unidos-Podemos and C’s do not show any sign of fraudulent manipulation. In
the case of PP results are less clear, as there indeed exists a (rather weak) tendency of the data to smear out towards
the top right corner (results for 2015 are very similar and have been reporter in appendix Fig. 21). We don’t find
any sign of systematic extreme fraud, although it is worth stating that we have found a small subset of municipalities
where just one party received 100% of the voteshare (see table III). Without exception, this is the popular party
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Year Political party test χ2 MAD
2015 PP 1BL 12.71 0.0455
2016 PP 1BL 7.13 0.0329
2015 PP 2BL 7.79 0.0325
2016 PP 2BL 7.43 0.0333
2015 PSOE 1BL 3.78 0.02628
2016 PSOE 1BL 2.90 0.0220
2015 PSOE 2BL 20.90 0.0541
2016 PSOE 2BL 4.15 0.0222
2015 Podemos & Co. 1BL 4.45 0.02638
2016 Unidos Podemos 1BL 7.09 0.0344
2015 Podemos & Co. 2BL 3.29 0.0168
2016 Unidos Podemos 2BL 8.46 0.0359
2015 C’s 1BL 4.81 0.02433
2016 C’s 1BL 5.24 0.0270
2015 C’s 2BL 15.39 0.0474
2016 C’s 2BL 8.86 0.0289
TABLE II: χ2 values of conformance to 1BL and 2BL for each political party extracted from the analysis performed when we
aggregate votes at the precinct level.
FIG. 9: Histograms of relative frequencies for the first (left panel) and second (right panel) significant digits for the main
political parties vote counts aggregated over precincts, for the case of 2016 (2015 is shown in appendix Fig. 20)
(PP), something that is in principle suspicious. Nevertheless a closer inspection reveals that these municipalities are
extremely small and thus consensus in one political option cannot be ruled out statistically.
A further interesting peculiarity for the case of the conservative party PP) is the existence of two clusters of mu-
nicipalities (bimodal distribution) that gathers two different voting strategies: one relatively small, located at small
voteshare and the other one at high voteshare, which is more spread out (we don’t observe bimodality for the rest
of political parties). We have labeled municipalities according to which cluster they belong (assigning a brown la-
bel for the larger cluster and a turquoise label for the smaller one) and plotted them in Fig. 11. Just by visual
inspection we can appreciate that the category linked with the smaller cluster is mainly formed by Catalonia and the
Basque Country (regions with pro-independence aspirations and a strong nationalist tradition), something that was
recently pointed out independently [19], and some further municipalities in regions that have been considered PSOE
strongholds historically.
V. DISCUSSION
In this work we have studied the statistical properties of vote counts in the Spanish national elections that took
place in December 2015 and June 2016, focusing on three separate questions: (i) breakdown of Bipartisanship, (ii)
region-to-region similarity in vote percentage, and (iii) election forensics for fraud detection.
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FIG. 10: Heatmaps plotting the percentage (in color scale) of municipalities where a given political party has received a certain
percentage of votes, as a function of the relative participation. These are results from the 2016 elections, the 2015 case is
reported in Fig.21. According to Klimek et al. [15] a smear out of the cluster towards the top-right corner of the heat map
is a sign of incremental fraud, whereas extreme fraud would occur for bimodal distributions where a cluster emerges at the
top-right corner.
Year Municipality Population Turnout Party receiving100% of the voteshare
2015 Castilnuevo (Guadalajara) 8 88% PP
2015 Valdemadera (La Rioja) 7 100% PP
2016 Castilnuevo (Guadalajara) 7 100% PP
2016 Rebollosa de Jadraque (Guadalajara) 10 90% PP
2016 Congostrina (Guadalajara) 16 62% PP
2016 La Vid de Bureba (Burgos) 16 65% PP
2016 Portillo de Soria (Soria) 16 75% PP
2016 Valdemadera (La Rioja) 8 88% PP
TABLE III: List of municipalities where a single party receives 100% of the voteshare.
On relation to (i), our results highlight that the bipartisanship system has suffered a clear breakdown in 2015 –at
least in regions associated to a more widespread cosmopolite society–. Such breakdown consolidate over time but
doesn’t increase, probably due to the risk aversion of not finding workable majorities in the second election round,
and even evidences a subtle decrease as captured by the diversity index Neff. Bipartisanship breakdown is actually a
quite complex phenomenon with a high degree of heterogeneity at a regional level, probably due to regional political
particularities.
Second, on relation to (ii) we have constructed a functional network of municipalities via cosine similarity of voting
profiles. Interestingly, there is a very good matching between network communities which emerge by a community
detection algorithm on the functional network and the actual Spanish autonomous communities. In particular, a
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FIG. 11: Focusing on the bimodal distribution for the conservative party that emerges in the heat map of Fig. 10, here we
show in a spatial map of Spain where we assign a brown color to those municipalities that belong to the larger cluster (high
voteshare) and a turquoise color to those that belong to the smaller cluster (low voteshare). We find that the low voteshare
cluster are predominantly linked with Catalonya and the Basque Country, the two areas of Spain with some pro-independence
aspirations. No obvious change is perceived between 2015 and 2016
classification of autonomous communities emerges naturally: we find that some autonomous communities whose
functional network community counterpart is more cohesive and stable over time (e.g. Catalonia, Basque Country,
Madrid, Navarra), some whose counterpart is only well defined in 2015 when Bipartisanship breakdown was more
acute (e.g. Murcia, Valencia, etc), and the rest where there is no clear matching. Beyond the probably amplified role
played by regionalist parties in 2015, we don’t have clear socio-political explanations for such emergent classification
and we leave this as an open problem. Other aspects left for future work include network pruning using different
criteria to the ones applied in this work, such as using a fixed similarity threshold.
On relation to fraud detection, for the 2016 elections, the unusually high discrepancy found between electoral surveys
preceding and on the day of the elections (26th June) and the actual electoral results have been a source of debate
and controversy in Spanish media. To the best of our knowledge, this work is among the first systematic analysis of
its kind for Spanish elections (see however [18, 19]). The first and general conclusion on relation to question (iii) we
have extracted is that the voting distributions don’t show any systematic and significant change between the 2015
and the 2016 elections, as all statistical results are qualitatively identical. This is in line with the original analysts
thesis that were discussed soon after it was learned that Spain had to go into a second election given the inability of
the parliament to find a suitable coalition, but at odds with most of the polls and surveys of vote intention which
were predicting a much different scenario as 26th June approached.
The first analysis is based on the hypothesis that under clean conditions, vote count data should conform to Benford’s
law. At the national scale we have found a general good qualitative and quantitative conformance to Benford’s law
for the first (1BL) and second (2BL) digits, with small deviations only occurring for 1BL in the conservative party,
where the null hypothesis can be rejected at 99% confidence in both years according to the standard Pearson χ2
hypothesis test, a result which is not confirmed using an alternative test (mean absolute deviation) proposed by
Nigrini. For 2BL only χ2 flags up some concerns at the 95% confidence level for Podemos / Unidos-Podemos, but
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 99% and again in this case, MAD statistic is less conservative and accepts
the null hypothesis for every party.
If we change the resolution and explore results for each individual precinct, results show a completely different story:
conformance to 1BL is accepted according to χ2 but systematically rejected according to MAD, and conformance to
2BL is consistently rejected according to both χ2 and MAD statistics for every precinct and every political party.
We have also shown that these are genuine results that cannot be associated to a lack of statistics. Finally, by
aggregating vote counts per precinct and analyzing conformance to 1BL and 2BL at this level of aggregation, we
obtain inconsistent and therefore inconclusive results, as χ2 cannot reject the null hypothesis above 95% confidence
level systematically but conversely MAD suggests systematic nonconformance. This lack of consistency raises the
question about what level of aggregation might be better-suited for BL-type analysis and which statistic is more
reliable when assessing the goodness of fit, issues that certainly deserve further investigation.
Given the somewhat mixed results and acknowledging that the applicability of Benford’s law tests to election forensic
is not completely free from controversy [16, 17], as a complementary analysis we further explored the correlations be-
tween percentage of participation and percentage of votes for each municipality, plotting two-dimensional histograms
to detect the presence of so-called incremental and/or extreme fraud as described by Klimek et al. [15]. Our results
suggest that the results for PSOE, Unidos-Podemos and C’s are apparently free from these mechanisms whereas in
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FIG. 12: (Left and middle panels) Heat maps of the Entropy index (E, see the text) at the municipality level (the darker,
the lower entropy, and the more bipartisanship the system is) for 2015 elections (left panel) and 2016 elections (middle panel).
Entropy is larger (leading to more heterogeneous vote and less bipartisanship) closer to cosmopolite cities (e.g. Madrid,
Barcelona, etc). Overall this index is approximately constant over time (〈E〉 = 0.34 ± 0.06 in 2015 and 〈E〉 = 0.33 ± 0.06 in
2016), similarly to the results obtained using the Bipartisanship index.
the case of PP we find a weak evidence of cluster smearing out similarly to what Klimek et al. refer to incremental
fraud, an evidence which needs to be studied in more detail. The heat map of the conservative party also shows
two clusters instead of a single one hence bimodality in the voteshare tendency: there exist two different groups of
municipalities, including a small one where the tendency is to give a small voteshare to PP and a larger one where
the voteshare takes larger values. Interestingly, according to a spatial analysis we have been able to confirm that the
low voteshare cluster typically corresponds to regions which are considered nationalist (Catalonia, Basque Country)
where the strength of regional options outperforms those that prevail at a nationwide scale.
All in all, these results suggest that further investigations and enquiries should be conducted in order to confirm and
clarify the presence or absence of some of these apparent irregularities, to elucidate their source and quantify their
impact in election results. On this respect, systematic comparative studies with historical SBipartisanshippanish
data and analogous data (analysis at different levels of aggregation) from other similar democratic countries are needed.
VI. APPENDIX
In this appendix we depict several additional figures and tables that complement the main study (see the main
text for references to each of these figures).
Availability of data and materials. The datasets supporting the conclusions of this article are available under
request.
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FIG. 16: χ2 values of the goodness of fit to 2BL for 2015 (left panel) and 2016 (right panel) at the aggregation level of
precincts. In every case the critical values for rejection at the 95 and 99% confidence level are shown. Virtually in all cases the
null hypothesis is rejected. All these results are consistent with the hypothesis test based on MAD reported in Fig. 17.
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FIG. 17: MAD values of the goodness of fit to 2BL for 2015 (left panel) and 2016 (right panel) at the aggregation level of
precincts. In every case the critical values for rejection at the 95 and 99% confidence level are shown. Virtually in all cases the
null hypothesis is rejected.
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FIG. 18: Scatter plot of the MAD (left panels) and χ2 (right panels) statistics extracted from the 1BL test of each precinct as
a function of the number of municipalities in each precinct for year 2015 (top panels) and 2016 (bottom panels). In the case of
MAD, we find a negative correlation as expected, but this correlation is not enough to explain the systematic nonconformance
to 1BL. In the case of χ2 there is no perceivable size effect.
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FIG. 19: Scatter plot of the number of orders of magnitude spaned by the voting populations of a precinct as a function of
the number of municipalities in each precinct, for 2015 (left) and 2016 (right). We find a positive correlation with R2 ≈ 0.47
suggesting that the ”size” of a precinct in terms of the number of municipalities explains with 47% of the variation in the
support (in terms of orders of magnitude) of the number of votes (the larger the number of municipalities, the more likely
that the number of votes take values from a larger number of orders of magnitude. The coefficient of 0.004 indicates that, on
average, when we move from a precinct with x municipalities to one with x + 100, the ratio of the biggest population to the
smallest is 2.5 times bigger.
FIG. 20: Histograms of relative frequencies for the first (left panel) and second (right panel) significant digits for the main
political parties vote counts aggregated over precincts, for the case of 2015.
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FIG. 21: Heatmaps plotting the percentage (in color scale) of municipalities where a given political party has received a
certain percentage of votes, as a function of the relative participation. These are results associated to December 2015 elections.
According to Klimek et al. [15] a smear out of the cluster towards the top-right corner of the heat map is a sign of incremental
fraud, whereas extreme fraud would occur for bimodal distributions where a cluster emerges at the top-right corner.
23
Precinct Nmun Range 2015 Range 2016
Cadiz 44 383–162564 376–162111
Tarragona 184 36–89136 36–89031
A-Coruna 93 1020–196251 1007–196492
Zaragoza 304 12–98267 12–98399
Valencia-Valencia 284 37–43858 39–58015
Leon 211 42–101272 40–100862
Avila 248 13–43810 13–43759
Gipuzkoa 88 85–145679 85–145167
Granada 172 57–182735 119–182450
La-Rioja 174 5–108493 5–108755
Lugo 67 186–76951 183–77209
Castellon-Castello 135 16–116252 14–116049
Jaen 97 297–89693 285–89487
Cordoba 75 305–255629 301–255476
Barcelona 320 25–184321 23–182889
Araba-Alava 51 140–183368 136–183559
Valladolid 225 24–243129 20–242609
Teruel 236 10–25834 10–25959
Ourense 92 331–85240 314–85329
Palencia 191 13–63236 15–63072
Navarra 272 17–145462 16–145189
Asturias 78 146–223974 139–223268
Huelva 79 47–111520 45–111093
Pontevedra 62 535–232242 542–232465
Soria 183 8–28459 7–28540
Madrid 199 36–176867 38–176527
Sevilla 115 272–97848 266–98048
Huesca 202 18–38062 21–37988
Illes-Balears 67 192–275448 178–275883
Lleida 231 51–90807 48–90289
Cantabria 102 64–135418 66–135258
Murcia 45 492–308510 482–309387
Malaga 113 133–83852 142–84163
Ciudad-Real 102 81–57081 84–57248
Cuenca 238 10–40719 10–40722
Caceres 223 70–72783 75–74773
Segovia 209 17–38948 16–38867
Guadalajara 288 8–58795 7–59179
Girona 221 59–63288 62–63305
Salamanca 362 16–116942 17–117091
Almeria 103 70–139271 62–139412
Bizkaia 119 116–78875 111–78573
Toledo 204 6–61813 6–61731
Santa-Cruz-de-Tenerife 54 887–159534 919–159695
Albacete 87 54–130156 55–130572
Alicante-Alacant 141 44–234975 46–234691
Las-Palmas 34 508–292289 496–292504
Badajoz 165 63–111575 66–114755
Zamora 248 34–51358 34–51049
Burgos 371 5–134171 5–133923
TABLE IV: List of precincts with their number of different municipalities and the voting population ranges (by voting population
we mean the number of possible voters). The largest cities, such as Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, Sevilla, Valencia, Zaragoza and
Malaga have been subsequently divided into electoral districts and we have treated these latter districts as municipalities.
